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Why Is Infrastructure
David Alan Aschauer*
As the decade of the 1990s begins, new challenges present them-
selves to the citizenry of the United States. Among the most important
are concerns about the environment, economic productivity, and inter-
national competitiveness, and a rearrangement of standing strategic
military relationships. Our future quality of life, economic prosperity,
and security depend crucially on how we choose to meet these new
challenges.
The apparent failure of the communist economic system and the
associated relaxation of Cold War tensions offer the potential for a
significant reallocation of the nation’s resources from military to other
uses. A crucial question then arises whether these resources should be
channeled to the private sector, effecting overall government expendi-
ture reduction, or kept within the public sector, thereby inducing an
alteration in the composition of government spending.
The first direction, expenditure reduction, certainly has merit to a
broad class of individuals. Many would point to the fact that total federal
government outlays, expressed relative to gross national product, rose
from 14.8 percent in 1950 to 21.6 percent in 1980 and, in 1989, to 21.8
percent. Others would point to the persistence of federal budget
deficits. To both groups, expenditure reduction would be of benefit to
economic performance, either by reducing the overall scale of govern-
ment activity in the economy or by allowing a reduction in interest rates
and an expansion in domestic investment activity.
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But the second direction, expenditure reorientation, may also have
merit. It could well be the case that quality of life and economic
performance would be best served by retaining the resources within the
public sector and expanding expenditure in certain critical areas. One
candidate area is infrastructure, the public stock of social and economic
overhead capital. Indeed, it has been claimed in the popular press that
"it’s hard to escape America’s crumbling infrastructure" and that "even
though the deterioration of U.S. highways, bridges, airports, harbors,
sewage systems, and other building blocks of the economy has been
exhaustively documented in recent years, there has been scant prog-
ress" in addressing the postulated need to renew the public capital stock
(Industry Week, May 21, 1990).
This paper reviews some of the ways in which infrastructure may be
"important," and, by implication, considers the validity of any case to
increase investment in infrastructure facilities. The first section dis-
cusses linkages between infrastructure and overall quality of life, while
the second section looks at the potential importance of public infrastruc-
ture spending to the aggregate economy. The third section concludes
the paper.
Infrastructure and Quality of Life
In the early 1960s, "quality of life" emerged as a central focus of
public policy. The persistence of such social problems as urban and
regional poverty, poor race relations, inadequate health care, and
insufficient housing, as well as a growing recognition of environmental
degradation, motivated social scientists to search for improved methods
of assessing social trends and appropriate institutional responses.
One reflection of this research endeavor was the attempt by a
number of economists to extend the national product accounts to
include measurements of social as well as economic performance.1 A
second reflection was the "social indicator movement" begun by Bauer
(1966) to provide a set of indicators of the current status of the quality of
life in the United States, social indicators that were analogous to the
existing set of economic indicators. The number of social indicator
studies rose rapidly from the publication of Bauer’s book, and beginning
in 1972 the United States government published a serial entitled Social
Indicators.2
See, for example, Juster (1972).
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One interesting outgrowth of this social indicator movement was
the heroic attempt by Terleckyj (1975) to devise an "analytical frame-
work for systematically assessing existing possibilities for social change
measured by a set of quantitative indicators" with a focus on the
"possible sources of change in specific social conditions that represent
major aspects of the quality of life." His approach involved the consid-
eration of various policy actions and their ultimate impact on social
concerns, including health, public safety, and education. The elements
of the list of social concerns each required major public activities (such as
the provision of infrastructure) as well as private activities. The effects of
the activities were measured by quantitative responses of indicators,
such as average life expectancy (yielding information about the effects
on health), number of violent crimes per 100,000 population (public
safety), and the number of individuals completing college (education).
Unfortunately, Terleckyj’s framework cannot be readily applied
today to assess the potential gains to the quality of life from public
infrastructure improvements. Much has changed since 1975 in terms of
the role of various infrastructure services as an "input" into certain
activities, the costs of those and related private services, and underlying
resource constraints. It should also be pointed out that many of the
projections in Terleckyj’s framework were based on rather questionable
(though understandable) assumptions and involved little direct empir-
ical knowledge and, correspondingly, much judgment.
Instead, the best that can be accomplished here is to adapt Ter-
leckyj’s conceptual framework to trace out a number of the linkages
between infrastructure investments across functional categories and
various aspects of life quality, such as health, safety, recreation, and
general aesthetics; economic opportunity; and leisure. The hope. is that
the major linkages between infrastructure and quality of life are cap-
tured. The exercise cannot aspire to be quantitative.
Table 1 indicates some of the more important linkages between
infrastructure and quality of life. To focus on the potential gains from
infrastructure investment, the set of candidate projects is limited, at
least conceptually, to those that yield a Pareto improvement along the
various quality-of-life dimensions. For instance, the construction of a
freeway may reduce congestion and thereby support better health
(improved air quality due to less smog), greater safety (fewer accidents),
recreational activities (better access), economic opportunity (improved
access to suburban jobs), and leisure (more discretionary time). But the
particular highway construction may also involve disamenities to certain
segments of the population and, by diverting commuters from mass
transportation to automobiles, may increase air pollution. In the table,
the investment is interpreted broadly to include the measures necessary
to forestall any negative impacts---in the freeway example, the buildingTable 1
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Table 2
Ability of Assessed River/Stream Miles and Lake Acres to Support Designated
Use, 1984
Percent Rivers and Streams Lakes
Supporting 73 78
Partially supporting 14 16
Not supporting 6 5
Unknown 7 1
Source: EPA (1985).
of fences and landscaping to eliminate negative aesthetic effects as well
as the granting of subsidies to maintain mass transit ridership.
At present, concern is widespread about whether existing and
projected infrastructure facilities can adequately support quality of life
requirements and improvements in the ways indicated in Table 1. Since
apprehension appears to be greatest in the areas of the environment and
transportation, the following discussion focuses on water quality, solid
waste disposal, mobility needs, and traffic congestion.
Water Quality: Health and Aesthetics
The construction grants program associated with the Clean Water
Act of 1972 spurred the expenditure of over $40 billion on the building
and updating of sewage treatment facilities, seen to have had "signifi-
cant positive impacts on the Nation’s water quality.’" For example, in
Virginia the annual flow of wastewater rose by 33 percent between 1976
and 1£83, yet a significant simultaneous reduction in pollution occurred,
¯ as oxygen-dissolving organic wastes fell by 22 percent. In North Caro-
lina, the extent of degraded stream mileage was reduced from 3,000
miles to 1,000 miles within the same period (U.S. Department of the
Interior, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 1985).
Despite this and other evidence of progress, inadequate municipal
wastewater treatment remains a significant problem in many areas of
the country. Many streams and lakes are incapable of supporting a
variety of their designated commercial or recreational uses. As Table 2
shows, in 1984, 6 percent of the evaluated river and stream mileage and
5 percent of the lake acreage in the United States were deemed unfit to
support designated use; another 14 percent and 16 percent, respectively,
were capable only of partial support of assigned uses. Table 3 indicates
the likely sources of the use impairment of streams, rivers, and lakes in
1984. As can be seen, municipal point sources accounted for nearly26 David Alan Aschauer
Table 3
Sources of Use Impairment of Rivers, Streams, and Lakes, 1984








one-third of the total use impairment for lakes and a non-negligible
fraction of use impairment for rivers. In the same year, elevated toxicity
levels were reported in the waters of 37 states, and municipal facilities
were found to be the source of 9 percent of the discovered toxics (arising
largely as the result of the receipt and inadequate subsequent processing
of untreated industrial wastes). According to the EPA, "many munici-
palities have yet to construct sewage treatment facilities that can meet
permit requirements." In other municipalities, particularly in the North-
east, storm and sanitary sewers are combined in the same system and
result in waste discharges during periods of heavy rainfall (combined
sewer overflows). Connecticut reported that combined sewer outflows
(CSOs) are the state’s "primary sewer system infrastructure problem,"
and Maine indicated that "progress in reducing the impacts of CSOs will
be slow in many communities because of the great expenses involved in
upgrading sewage collection systems and because of cutbacks in the
construction grants program" (EPA 1985).
Solid Wastes: Health and Aesthetics
The ability of municipalities to deal with garbage is an escalating
problem. In 1960, the solid waste generated in the United States
amounted to 2.65 pounds per person per day, while by 1986 it had
reached 3.58 pounds per person per day. This is over one pound per
person per day more than is produced in West Germany, a country that
by most measures is at an equal state of industrial development. Solid
wastes in the United States amounted to 87.5 million tons per year in
1960 and 157.7 million tons per year in 1986. The latter amount would be
sufficient to fill a "convoy of 10-ton garbage trucks, 145,000 miles long,
which is over half the distance between the earth and the moon"
(Executive Office of the President, Council on Environmental Quality
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At the same time that garbage is being generated at unprecedented
rates, the number of facilities capable of handling the waste is shrinking.
In 1978, approximately 20,000 municipal landfills were operating in the
United States; by 1986, fewer than 6,000. The Council on Environmental
Quality forecasts that by 1993 about 2,000 of the remaining landfills will
be at capacity and "many more will be closed due to inadequate safety
or environmental practices as new standards take effect. Some states
such as Florida, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New Jersey are
expecting to close about all of their currently operating landfills in the
next few years."
Furthermore, a significant fraction of existing landfill facilities do
not meet federal and state environmental standards. Only 25 percent of
the facilities monitor groundwater for possible pollution and more than
50 percent make no attempt to control for water pollution caused by
rainwater runoff from the landfill site (EPA 1986). An EPA evaluation of
case studies of 163 municipal solid waste landfills disclosed that 146
were contaminating groundwater, 73 were contaminating surface wa-
.ters, and at several sites even drinking water was found to be contam-
inated (EPA 1988a). The EPA has reported to Congress that fully 22
percent of the sites on the Superfund National Priorities List are
municipal landfills. These statistics "suggest that a large portion of
landfill municipal solid waste ends up in places where it might contam-
inate groundwater." In addition to the health risks posed by the
landfills, aesthetic problems are common; about 875 of the nation’s 5200
operating municipal landfills have been cited in recent years for high
odor levels (Executive Office of the President, Council on Environmental
Quality 1989).
In the future, the closing down of landfills will require different
techniques for managing solid wastes: source reduction, through im-
proved product design and manufacture to reduce the quantity and
toxicity of waste at the end of a product’s useful life; heightened
emphasis on recycling; and increased incineration. Dramatic examples
show the effectiveness of the first two of these options: in the past
twenty years the weight in aluminum beverage cans has been reduced
by 20 percent, and certain municipalities, such as Wilton, New Hamp-
shire, have been able to recycle in excess of 40 percent (by weight) of
total solid waste at a profit (Council on Environmental Quality 1989). In
1988, 134 municipal incinerators were operating, with 22 more under
construction and 9 in final planning stages. The main difficulty with
incineration appears to be the generated fly and bottom ash; in 1986,
incinerators were producing in excess of three million tons of potentially
hazardous ash a year.28 David Alan Aschauer
Mobility Needs: Economic Opportunity
A key function of the nation’s public mass transportation system is
to provide basic mobility for those who are unable to utilize automobile
transportation--the "transit dependent." According to the Urban Mass
Transit Administration (1988b), "an improved quality of life requires
increased mobility and access; this is particularly true for the transpor-
tation disadvantaged and those who are disabled and elderly." Indeed,
disabled citizens cite a lack of appropriate transportation as the "chief
barrier to getting jobs and being fully productive members of their
communities" (U.S. Department of Transportation 1990).
Respondents to the Census Bureau’s American Housing Survey (1973
and 1983) typically place public transportation at the top of the list of
"inadequate neighborhood services." Also, the apparent trend in atti-
tudes is increasingly unfavorable; whereas 36.1 percent of owner-
occupied households and 24.3 percent of renter-occupied households
reported in 1973 that public transportation was inadequate to meet their
needs, 51.1 and 32.9 percent, respectively, so reported by 1983.
In addition, many communities, such as Chicago and Philadelphia,
cite a growing transportation problem due to changing geographical
commuting patterns. Traditional commuting to the central business
district from the suburbs continues to place heavy demands on the
transit system, but in many localities job opportunities in the suburbs
are left unexploited because of lack of transportation from the city core.
In the words of an Argonne National Laboratory report,
public policy should recognize that reverse [com~nuting] service has been
particularly poor and, generally speaking, ridership has been limited to those
with no other transportation alternatives. These "captive riders" are dispro-
portionately minorities, older workers, women, and the working poor. Few
would deny that these riders need some basic level of service. All too often,
however, that need goes unmet.
Congestion: Leisure
Usage of the nation’s surface and air transportation network has
grown tremendously in the past three decades. On the roads, travel by
occupants of passenger vehicles has risen from 592 million miles in 1960
to 1,372 million miles in 1987; during the same period, motor vehicle
freight carriage has climbed at a 4.5 percent annual rate, from 201 to 674
billion ton-miles. On the airways, growth in passenger travel and freight
carriage has been more rapid, at 8.6 percent per year for both categories
of air network use (Central Intelligence Agency 1989; U.S. Department
of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration 1980 and 1987.)
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Table 4
Forecast of Urban Highway Delays
Urban Freeway Signalized Arterial
Vehicle Hours % Vehicle Hours %
Forecast (Millions) Change (Millions) Change
1985 Delay 722 -- 146 --
2005 Delay 3869 +436 496 +241
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration (1987).
ration facilities has been surface and air traffic congestion. The General
Accounting Office (1989) reports that "traffic congestion is an escalating
transportation problem in this country. An increasing proportion of
both rural and urban interstate freeways are operating under crowded
conditions." Indeed, while in 1980 only 32 percent of urban interstates
were in a congested state, by 1987 this statistic had pressed upward to
46 percent (65 percent at peak hour time periods) (U.S. Federal Highway
Administration 1980 and 1987). A survey of participants in a national
transportation outreach program discovered that 80 percent of the
20,000 respondents felt that traffic congestion was a problem in their
communities (Beyond Gridlock 1988). In Atlanta and San Francisco,
opinion polls indicate that traffic congestion has now eclipsed crime,
unemployment, and air pollution as the highest priority public policy
issue by a two-to-one margin (U.S. Department of Transportation 1989).
And, according to the Department of Transportation (1990), the 21
primary airports that handle 80 percent of the nation’s air travel are
considered "seriously congested," experiencing 20,000 hours of flight
delays annually.
Without doubt, the congestion problem will become increasingly
severe in coming years. Table 4 shows the results of a Federal Highway
Administration forecast of urban highway delays in the year 2005 if the
highway system is not expanded to meet projected usage. Urban
freeway delays are projected to reach nearly four billion hours annual-
ly--a 436 percent increase from 1985--and urban arterial delays are
expected to climb to about one-half billion hours--a 241 percent in-
crease. The Federal Aviation Administration forecasts that air passenger
enplanements will climb at a 4.3 percent annual rate between 1989 and
2001, from 485 million to 815 million (U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion, Federal Aviation Administration 1989).
In the future, dealing with highway traffic congestion will require a
many-faceted strategy. Increased capacity through construction of new
routes, adding lanes to existing routes, and reconstruction will be one
such facet, but others will be necessary as well. Transportation system30 David Alan Aschauer
management will need improvement so as to maximize the effective
supply of existing capacity (for example, traffic signal coordination) and
to lower traffic demand (by such programs as ride-sharing). The re-
search, development, and implementation of advanced technologies
utilizing computers and telecommunications offer great hope for reduc-
ing congestion; in the extreme, the "goal is to make roads so ’smart’ that
they can guide ’intelligent’ vehicles without direction from the drivers"
(General Accounting Office 1989). Significantly, all major automotive
companies are currently developing electronic navigation systems.
The discussion above has only touched upon the many ways in
which the current and future status of the nation’s infrastructure may
add to, or detract from, overall quality of life. Numerous additional
cases can be found where quality of life has been or will soon be
improved--or eroded-~as a result of infrastructure capabilities. For
example, the reported level of crimes against persons and households
has abated; at least as measured by victimization rates, partly as "a
result of increased incapacitation of larger numbers of career criminals";
between 1980 and 1987, the federal prison population rose by 83 percent
while the percentage of the prison population granted paroles fell from
70 percent to 63 percent (U.S. Parole Commission 1989). Yet the "current
level of prison overcrowding coupled with substantial growth in the
future prison population" is likely to "create a crisis of major propor-
tions in the Federal criminal justice system" unless added capacity is
forthcoming. Similarly, the nation’s highway system has become safer
as a result of a variety of safety improvement projects carried out over
the period from 1974 to 1987; as one example, during that time
rail-highway crossing fatalities have been reduced by 89 percent (U.S.
Department of Transportation 1989). Yet in 1989 nearly one-half of the
nation’s rural bridges were found to be "structurally deficient or
functionally obsolete," with the potential for causing future injury and
loss of life (New York Times, September 27, 1989).
In many other cases, rapid economic, demographic, and social
change will strain the ability of available infrastructure facilities to
maintain an adequate quality of life in the United States. Persistent
water quality problems due to inadequate waste treatment; solid waste
disposal difficulties because of the shrinkage of landfill capacity; height-
ened crime resulting from prison overcrowding and early release of
criminals; additional loss of leisure time due to traffic congestion--all are
to be anticipated unless more attention is directed to the nation’s
infrastructure requirements.WHY IS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPORTANT? 31
Infrastructure and the Economy
Quality of life issues will thus remain a central focus of infrastruc-
ture policy. During the 1980s, however, the adequacy of the stock of
infrastructure has increasingly been called into question. The final
report of the National Council on Public Works Improvement (1988)
stresses the importance of infrastructure to the economy:
The quality of a nation’s infrastructure is a critical index of its economic
vitality. Reliable transportation, clean water, and safe deposit of wastes are
basic elements of a civilized society and a productive economy. Their absence
or failure introduces a major obstacle to growth and competitiveness.
The potential importance of trends in infrastructure spending to the
macroeconomy can be discussed by utilizing the framework in Arrow
and Kurz (1970) and in Aschauer and Greenwood (1985). These authors
expand on the standard neoclassical production function, expressed in
labor-intensive form, to include the public stock of infrastructure capital:
y = f(k, kg)
where y = private sector output, k = private capital, and kg = public
infrastructure capital (all expressed relative to employment).3
A clear implication of including public capital in the private produc-
tion technology is that it may play a direct role in promoting private
sector productivity. Indeed, some, albeit limited, empirical evidence
suggests that the public capital stock is an important factor of production
in the aggregate production technology. Aschauer (1989a) presents time
series evidence for the post-World War II period in the United States
that a "core infrastructure" of streets and highways, mass transit,
airports, water and sewer systems, and electrical and gas facilities bears
a substantially positive and statistically significant relationship to both
labor and multifactor productivity. Munnell (1990) adjusts the standard
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) measure of labor input to account
3 Here, the services of the private and public capital stock are assumed to be
proportional to the existing stocks and the services of public capital are assumed to be
offered to the private sector free of charge. While user charges are applied for a variety of
government infrastructure services, such charges are typically less than the total cost of
providing such services. For example, in 1987 state highway user tax revenues and tolls
equaled $26.5 billion, while total highway disbursements equaled $46.3 billion (Highway
Statistics 1987). In 1986, of the total federal airport and airway spending of $4 billion, $2.7
billion was funded from general revenues (Congressional Budget Office 1988). Hence, to
a significant extent, public infrastructure should be considered an uncompensated
intermediate factor of production in the private production function.32 David Alan Aschauer
for changes in the age/sex composition of the labor force, updates the
sample period to 1987, and obtains similarly strong results for the
importance of public capital in private sector production. Munnell also
computes adjusted measures of multifactor productivity growth and
finds that after accounting for changes in the quality of the labor force
and for changes in the growth rate of the core infrastructure capital
stock, the fall-off in multifactor productivity growth during the 1970s
and 1980s relative to the 1950s and 1960s is "much more in line with
expectations" and that "much of the drop in published multifactor
productivity numbers may reflect the omission of public capital from the
calculation of inputs rather than a decline in technological innovation
(p. 19)."
Aschauer (1989c) employs cross-country data for the Group-of-
Seven nations over the period 1965 to 1985 and finds that upon
controlling for private investment and employment growth, public
nonmilitary investment bears a significantly positive relationship with
growth in gross domestic product per employed person. On the other
hand, public consumptionwinclusive of military expenditure---bears a
marginally significant negative relationship to productivity growth. It is
also of interest that public investment spending as a share of gross
domestic product fell during the late 1960s and early 1970s for five of the
seven countries in the sample, the exceptions being Japan and Italy. The
ratio of public investment to public consumption declined in all the
Group of Seven countries.
Another implication of including public capital in the production
technology is that changes in the public capital stock may influence the
marginal productivity of private factors of production. Aschauer (1988)
presents results based on an aggregate time series analysis which
suggest that the rate of return to private capital in the nonfinancial
corporate sector is positively affected by changes in the stock of public
capital per worker. Employing data on manufacturing firms over the
period 1970 to 1978, Deno (1988) finds similarly strong effects of public
capital--highways, sewers, water facilities, as well as the total--in a
translog profit function; in particular, he finds evidence of a comple-
mentary relationship between public and private capital. While Eberts
(1986) also finds that the public capital stock makes a positive and
significant contribution to manufacturing output, the magnitude of the
effect is considerably smaller than indicated by Deno’s results. Deno
reconciles the difference by arguing that his own approach is more
flexible, as it allows responses by firm output supply as well as factor
demands to changes in public capital.
Given that public capital complements private capital, an increase in
the public capital stock can be expected to stimulate private capital
accumulation through its effect on the profitability of private capital.WHY IS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPORTANT? 33
Holding fixed the profit rate of private capital, however, higher public
capital investment can also be expected to reduce private investment as
national---private plus public--investment is pushed beyond the level
that would be chosen by optimizing agents. Aschauer (1989b) finds that
the U.S. time series data suggest both channels of the effect of public
investment on private investment may well be operative. Specifically, he
presents results that indicate a nearly one-to-one "crowding out" of
private by public investment holding fixed the rate of return to private
capitalwas well as a "crowding in" of private investment by public
investment, as the rate of return to capital responds, over time, to the
increases in the public capital stock brought about by higher public
investment.
It is instructive to bring together some of these empirical results in
order to consider the potential, simultaneous effects of higher public
investment on the profitability of private capital, on private investment,
and on productivity growth. This is accomplished by utilizing the
aforementioned empirical estimates to construct a minimal model capa-
ble of simulating the effect of higher public investment on the aggregate
economy. These simulations are to be taken as only suggestive of the
true impact of changed public investment levels on these macroeco-
nomic variables; many reasonable objections to the approach could be
offered, such as that (1) movements in public nonmilitary investment are
taken as exogenous, (2) the model parameters are based on estimates of
disputable magnitude, (3) the model is too simple and ignores many
aspects of the interaction between public investment and the economy,
and (4) the Lucas (1976) critique of econometric policy evaluation casts
doubt on the general validity of such exercises. These objections will be
addressed below. Nevertheless, it is striking (at least to the author) how
closely some of the simulation results appear to match the results
obtained by other researchers from simulations of theoretical repre-
sentative agent growth models (Baxter and King 1988).
The simulation assumes an increase in the level of public nonmili-
tary investment by an amount equal to 1 percent of the private capital
stock during the period 1970 to 1986; this represents a 125 percent
increase in the level of public investment over its actual average level
during the period 1970 to 1986. Table 5 provides data on actual and
simulated levels of the rate of return to private nonfinancial corporate
capital (measured as the ratio of corporate profits net of depreciation,
plus net interest payments, to the total value of the net capital stock); of
net private investment in nonresidential structures and equipment
(measured as a percentage of private capital stock); and of private
business sector productivity growth (measured as growth in output per
labor hour). The actual data document the inferior economic perfor-
mance experienced during the period from 1970 to 1988 relative to the34 David Alan Aschauer
Table 5
Simulated Impact of Public Investment on Private Economy
Private Investment
Return to Private (% of Private Productivity Growth
Capital (%) Capital Stock) (% per Annum)
Time
Period Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
1953-69 10,7 -- 3.8 -- 2.8 --
1970-88 7.9 9.6 3.1 3.7 1.4 2.1
1970-74 8.7 10.7 3,9 3,9 1.5 1.9
1975-79 8,5 9.9 3.2 4.2 1.3 2.2
1980-84 6.7 8,4 2,7 3.0 1.1 1.9
1985-88 7.8 9.6 2.8 3.8 1.8 2.7
Source: See Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) |or details of method.
earlier period 1953 to 1969: a lower rate of return to private capital---7.9
percent as opposed to 10.7 percent; lower private investment--3.1
percent of the private capital stock rather than 3.8 percent; and lower
labor productivity growth---1.4 percent per annum as opposed to 2.8
percent.
The simulated data, on the other hand, reveal some interesting
potential relationships between public nonmilitary investment, private
profitability, private investment, and private sector productivity
growth. In the first five years of the expansion in public investment, the
rate of return to private capital rises by 2 percentage points over its
actual level, remaining at the 1953 to 1969 level of 10.7 percent instead of
falling to 8.7 percent. This is the cumulative positive effect of the rising
public capital stock on the productivity of private capital. During the
same period, the private investment rate averages 3.9 percent of the
private capital stock, the same as in the actual data. This reflects two
offsetting forces; in the first three years of the higher public investment,
private investment is pushed lower due to the direct crowding-out effect
of higher public investment, while in the next two years private
investment is brought above its historical level by the higher rate of
return to private capital. In the same period, private sector productivity
growth is enhanced, from 1.5 to 1.9 percent per year. As the private
investment rate (as a percent of the capital stock) is seen to remain
steady, this enhancement of productivity growth reflects the direct
positive effect of a growing public capital stock on the productivity of
labor.
In the later years of higher public investment, the rate of return to
private capital remains between i and 2 percentage points higher than in
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because the private investment rate climbs to a level up to 1 percentage
point higher than in the historical data, and the growing private capital
stock has a negative effect on the rate of return to private capital,
roughly offsetting the positive effect of the expanding public capital
stock. Productivity growth now rises by a more substantial amount--
nearly .1 percent per year above historical values--because the direct
effect of the growth in the public capital stock is augmented by the
indirect effect of a higher return to capital, raising private investment,
which, in turn, stimulates productivity growth.
On net, the simulation suggests the possibility that the performance
of the economy might have been greatly improved by an increased
investment in public facilities. Comparing the period 1970 to 1988 to the
earlier period 1953 to 1969, the rate of return to capital would have been
only 1.1 percentage points lower instead of 2.8 percentage points;
private investment would have been only 0.1 percentage point lower
rather than 0.7 percentage point; and annual productivity growth would
have been 0.7 percentage point per year lower instead of 1.4.
As was mentioned above, these results must be interpreted with
much caution, and a truly accurate picture of the relationship between
public investment and the economy must await further research. First,
a logical case can be made that public investment, ~ather than being
exogenous, may well be responding to changes in the private economy.
For instance, one could argue that slower growth in productivity, per
capita income, and tax revenue will induce the government to reduce
spending on public capital projects. In the extreme, this argument
concludes that the fall-off in public investment in the 1970s and 1980s
was a result, rather than a cause, of the slump in productivity growth
during the same period.
Yet this argument must confront the simple facts that public
nonmilitary investment expenditure, as a ratio to output, reached a peak
in the period between 1965 and 1968, while the usual dating of the onset
of the productivity decline is around 1973. Some would argue that the
productivity slump began as early as 1965, and others such as Darby
(1984) deny its very existence, but such economists are in the distinct
minority. As demonstrated in Aschauer (1989a), those functional cate-
gories of public capital that one would expect, on an a priori basis, to be
most productive--in particular, a core infrastructure of surface and air
transportation facilities, water and sewer systems, and electrical and gas
facilities--turn out to have the strongest statistical significance in esti-
mated productivity relations. Finally, Holtz-Eakin (1989) has looked in
some detail at the statistical association between public capital accumu-
lation and private productivity growth; he finds that a substantial
portion of the correlation reflects causation from the former variable to
the latter.36 David Alan Aschauer
An argument can also be made that the estimated impact of public
capital on productivity--one key parameter in the simulations above--
is too large to be reasonable. For instance, Montgomery (1989) states
that "the importance ascribe[d] to government investment . . . simply
strains credulity." Also, in a contribution to Setting National Priorities:
Policy for the Nineties, Schultze (1990) writes that the regression results in
Aschauer (1989a) "imply . . . that a $1 increase in the stock of public
infrastructure adds about as much to productivity as a $4 increase in the~
stock of private business capital" which, in his eyes, is indicative of
"grossly inflated estimates of the returns to infrastructure investment.’’4
Indeed, using the elasticity estimates contained in that paper and the
ratio of business output to the net public capital stock, a rate of return to
public capital in the range of 50 or 60 percent is generated. It should be
noted that this estimate of the rate of return, while substantial, is in line
with estimates of the rate of return to research and development (R&D)
capital. For example, Griliches (1986) finds overall rates of return to R&D
of between 30 and 60 percent, while Scherer (1982) estimates returns to
R&D to be as high as 74 percent.
Further, while rates of return to public investment in the 50 percent
range seem high relative to those estimated by conventional cost-benefit
techniques,5 this result conceivably could be caused by deficiencies in
cost-benefit methods. Such defects could arise for a variety of reasons,
including the use of an inappropriate rate of discount for public projects
(Ogura and Yohe 1977),6 the inherent difficulties involved in capturing
general equilibrium effects in partial-equilibrium cost-benefit analysis
(Hickling 1990), and the actual process of project selection (EPA 1984).
A third concern about the simulation exercise is that the model is
too simple; indeed, it takes movements in employment and capacity
utilization to be independent of changes in public investment spending.
The rationale for doing so is that the exercise focuses on forces operating
4 However, Schultze (1990) also states that "carefully selected public investment in
infrastructure can improve national productivity and output--the building of the interstate
highway system, for example, was undoubtedly a major contributor to the rise in national
productivity during the 1960s and 1970s."
s This is not to say that when benefit-cost analysis is applied small benefit-cost ratios
are always obtained. A Federal Highway Administration investment analysis of increased
spending on the federal-aid highway system reports that "given current investment
levels.., benefit-cost ratios range from an average of 5.9 for all the systems in the rural
areas to an average of 9.3 in the urbanized areas. Or, in more general terms, for every
dollar invested, there is about a $6 to $9 return in benefits." (Federal Highway Adminis-
tration 1987 no. 13). These ratios can be usefully compared to those of Schultze (1990).
6 In many cases, a 10 percent discount rate is used to discount benefit streams that are
inflation-adjusted, and so represents a very high discount rate. See, for example, the
calculation of the present value of benefits and costs in Public Works Infrastructure: Policy
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on the supply side as opposed to the demand side of the economy. Yet
traditional disequilibrium macroeconomic models would allow a direct,
demand-side effect of government spending on output and capacity
utilization. Even equilibrium macroeconomic models can allow for
significant positive output effects of public investment, at least in the
long run. Baxter and King (1988) show that a unit increase in public
investment spending may result in sizable output multipliers, substan-
tially in excess of unity. Aschauer (1990b) provides evidence that public
nonmilitary investment has a much more stimulative impact on output
than either public consumption or military investment; the output
multipliers attached to the former type of expenditure lie in the range of
4, while those associated with the latter two types lie well below unity.
Finally, the lessons of the Lucas critique must be heeded. It is highly
unlikely that the mix and level of public investment spending that was
optimal in the past forty years will be optimal in future years. To give a
simplistic example, even if it were established beyond doubt that the
interstate highway system was a key determinant of productivity
growth in the 1960s and 1970s, such knowledge would not necessarily
imply that a similar effect on productivity would be obtained from the
construction of another 40,000 miles of controlled access highways (even
if such construction were feasible).
In all, the discussion above should not be taken as an attempt to
prove that the level of public investment is clearly inadequate or that
public capital is capable of influencing productivity to the degree
indicated by the above simulation results. Instead, it should be viewed
as an attempt to convince the reader that further research into the
importance of public infrastructure spending to the private economy is
well justified. In this vein, the subsequent section yields additional
evidence on the role of infrastructure in influencing private sector
production.
New Evidence
The empirical analysis to follow employs cross-sectional state-level
data on gross state product and public infrastructure expenditure,
averaged over the roughly 20-year period from 1965 to 1983. The use of
cross-sectional, time-averaged data reflects a deliberate attempt to focus
on long-run as opposed to short-run relationships between output and
infrastructure spendingo7 This emphasis on the long-run relationships in
7 Other studies utilize state-level data on infrastructure capital and/or spending; see
Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1987) and Helms (1985). However, by utilizing pooled cross-38 David Alan Aschauer
the data also allows us to obtain reasonable proxies for steady-state,
capital-output ratios across states as well as to cast the analysis in a way
that may reduce the potential for various simultaneity biases.
Conceptual Issues
Consider a government sector that absorbs resources and provides
services to individuals within its jurisdiction. Some services may be
oriented toward consumption, such as the establishment and operation
of a community park, while others are oriented toward production, such
as the building and maintenance of streets and highways. The produc-
tive services, in turn, act as intermediate inputs into the production
function of the jurisdiction; we have
Y = F(K,G,N;Z) = ZKaGbN1 - a - b
where Y --- level of output within the jurisdiction, K = private fixed
capital, G = level of government productive services, N = population or
labor force, and Z = index of technological progress. At this point, we
assume that the production function displays constant returns to scale
over all inputs, inclusive of government services.
We next transform the production technology so as to relate the
logarithm of output per person to the logarithm of the private capital-
output ratio and to the logarithm of the ratio of government productive
services to output. Upon rearrangement and the taking of natural
logarithms, the production function may be written as
y/n = Ez + a(k/y) + b(g/y)]/(1 - a - b)
where lower-case variables denote the logarithms of the respective
upper-case variables. This formulation of the production technology is
advantageous because good state-level data on capital stocks are cur-
rently unavailable. Written in this form, the estimation of the production
relation requires information about the capital-output ratio only, for
which we now provide a reasonable proxy.
To this end, we extrapolate from the apparent long-run behavior of
capital-output ratios for those countries for which good capital stock
data are available. Romer (1989), citing Maddison (1982), asserts that no
long-run trend is to be found in capital-output ratios for such countries.
state time series data, these studies tend to confound long-run and short-run effects of
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Analogously, we assume that for individual states
D(k/y) = O
where Dx = percentage rate of change in X within a specified time
period. This implies that the steady-state capital-output ratio is given as
the following function of the investment to output ratio, I/Y, the rate of
growth of output, Dy, and the depreciation rate, d:
K/Y = (I/Y)/(Dy + d).
Given an assumption for the depreciation rate applicable to capital
structures and equipment, information about the investment to output
ratio and the rate of output growth translates into information about the
capital-output ratio in a particular locale.
For the main part of the analysis below, we assume a depreciation
rate for structures and equipment of 5 percent per year.8 This depreci-
ation rate is a weighted average of assumed depreciation rates for
residential structures of 2.5 percent, for nonresidential structures of 5
percent, and for equipment of 10 percent, the weights being given by
the percentage of the aggregate United States capital stock composed of
each type of capital.9 Similarly, the weighted (by individual states’
shares of total output) average capital-output ratio equals 1.67, which
compares favorably with the aggregate ratio of private equipment and
structures to output during this time period. For instance, in 1978--a
year when the actual unemployment rate of 6 percent was at or very
near standard estimates ’of the natural unemployment rate the aggre-
gate capital-output ratio equalled 1.63. Further, substantial variation in
estimated capital-output ratios occurs across states, with the ratios
ranging from 2.32 to 1.10 and having a standard deviation equal to 0.22.
In utilizing these proxies for capital-output ratios in the subsequent
empirical analysis, the implicit assumption is that only a minor portion
of the true variability in capital-output ratios across states can be
attributed to variability in depreciation rates.
We next assume that capital is mobile and flows across jurisdictional
boundaries such that, at least in the long run, the marginal product of
private capital is equalized across jurisdictions. Since the marginal
a We note, however, that the empirical results are not too sensitive to reasonable
alterations in the average depreciation rate (say between 4 percent and 6 percent).
9 For example, in 1970, the aggregate private fixed capital stock equalled $4,312 billion
(1982), of which $2,100 billion (49 percent) was in the form of residential capital, $1,272
billion (29 percent) in nonresidential structures, and $940 billion (22 percent) in equipment.
Employing these weights yields an average depreciation rate of 4.9 percent.40 David Alan Aschauer
product of capital and the elasticity of output with respect to capital are
related by
a = (K/Y)FK,
differences in output elasticities will necessarily be reflected by differ-
ences in capital-output ratios. Similarly, the marginal product of gov-
ernment services and the elasticity of output with respect to such
services is expressed as
b = (G/Y)Fc.
We also assume that the government sector chooses a level of
services so as to equate the marginal productivity of services in a
particular jurisdiction to that in other jurisdictions; consequently, differ-
ences in levels of government services, relative to output, will also
reflect differences in production technologies across jurisdictions.
Substitution of the elasticity conditions into the production function
then yields
y/n = ~z + FK(K/Y)(k/y) + Fc(G/Y)(g/y)] / ~1 - FK(K/Y) - F~(G/Y)]
which is the basic expression to be estimated below.
Estimation
We now estimate the above production relation by using average
data from 1965 to 1983 for the 50 states. Table 6 shows nonlinear
estimates of the production relationship between per capita output, the
capital-output ratio (assuming a 5 percent depreciation rate), and
government spending.1° All regressions are corrected for a heteroske-
dastic error structure.11 At this point, we ignore the possible endogene-
10 For the entire period 1965 to 1983, the only employment data available are for the
nonagricultural sector. It is expected that the relationship between total employment and
total population is closer than is that between total employment and nonagricultural
employment, so the empirical analysis uses population as a proxy for total employment.
n The estimated errors of the various regressions showed a strong and persistent
relation to population. If we assume that the true error variance is related to population as
in
e2 = c (0) ¯ Nc(1) u2
where u is a homoskedastic error term and estimate using the residuals from the
unweighted regressions, we obtain estimates of c(1) near -.7 with associated standard
errors of approximately .2. For instance, in an equation including core infrastructure as the
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Table 6
Production Relationships of Per Capita Output, Capital-Output Ratio,
and Government Spending
Dependent Variable ~ y/n
INSTR             (1) (2) (3)
FK .114 .116 .093
(.037) (.039) (.042)
FG1 2.226 2.230 1.960
(,389) (,398) (.496)
FG2 --.250 --.254 .136
(.160) (.204) (.422)
ne .117 .126 ,142
(,029) (.028) (.028)
mw .140 .142 .137
(.022) (.023) (.023)
w .102 .108 ,135
(.031) (.031) (.035)
ha .281 .284 .327
(.166) (,167) (.168)
~2 .988 .988 ,988
SER .086 .087 .088
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, Equations also include constant term.
Column (1) employs G1 -= core infrastructure spending, G2 -= total government spending minus core
infrastructure spending.
Column (2) employs G1 -= core infrastructure spending, G2 ~ total government spending minus welfare,
net interest payments, and core infrastructure spending.
Column (3) employs G1 --- core infrastructure spending, G2 ---- educational expenditure.
Fk ~ marginal product of private capital.
Dummy variables: ne = Northeast, mw= Midwest, w = West, ha = Hawaii and Alaska.
ity of the government spending variables; this concern will be addressed
shortly. The first column of Table 6 employs government spending on
"core" infrastructure such as streets and highways, sewers and sanita-
tion (G1), and all other government spending (G2). The marginal
product of private capital, FK, is estimated to be .114 (standard error =
.037), which appears reasonable in light of the fact that the actual rate of
return to the aggregate stock of nonfinancial corporate reproducible
capital during this period ranged from .150 (in 1965) to .061 (in 1981).12
The associated estimate of the elasticity of output with respect to
regressions make use of the weight n7 although using the square root of population yields
essentially the same results.
12 These rates of return are taken from the Survey of Current Business (April 1987).42 David Alan Aschauer
reproducible capital, using an average capital-output ratio of 1.67
(thereby assuming an average depreciation rate of 5 percent), is then
calculated to equal. 19.
The estimate of the marginal product of core infrastructure spend-
ing is 2.226 (s.e. = .389), while that of all other government expenditure
combined is -.250 (s.e. = .160). Thus, the level of per capita output is
positively and significantly related to core infrastructure and negatively
though insignificantly related to other government spending. It can also
be seen that the marginal product of other government spending lies
significantly below that of core infrastructure spending. In a paper with
a production framework similar to the above, Barro (1989) argues that
optimizing governments will choose a level of productive services so as
to set the elasticity of output with respect to government productive
services, eel, equal to the share of such services in total output, sol. In
Barro’s framework, a level of productive services such that ec = sc
maximizes the marginal product of private capital, which, in turn, raises
the rate of economic growth to an optimal level. More generally,
however, the fulfillment of this condition ensures that the government
will be maximizing the net (of government) product available for private
use. On the other hand, if e~l > (<) s~, then the government has
under- (over-) expanded in the sense that the net output to the private
sector will be lower than if e~ = s~. Using the estimated marginal
productivity of 2.226, we find the elasticity of output with respect to
infrastructure services equals .055, substantially above the (nominal)
share of infrastructure spending in output, which equals .025.
The equation estimated in the first column also indicates that the
level of per capita output is particularly low in the South, even after
accounting for differences in the intensity of capital and government
services in production, as dummy variables for the Northeast, the
Midwest, the West, and for Hawaii and Alaska are all significantly
positive.
The next column once again employs core infrastructure expendi-
ture (labeled, as before, G1), but now limits other government spending
(G2) to goods and services expenditures by also subtracting transfer
spending on welfare and net interest payments. The results are essen-
tially the same as for total government spending; the estimated produc-
tivity of core infrastructure spending equals 2.230 (s.e. = .398) while that
of other spending is insignificantly negative. The third column employs
core infrastructure (G1) and total education spending (G2); the esti-
mated marginal productivity of core infrastructure is reduced to 1.96
(s.e, = .496), while the estimated productivity of educational spending
is insignificantly positive at .136 (s.e. = .422). One possible interpreta-
tion of the small coefficient on education spending is that governments
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interpretation, however, is that because of labor mobility, the produc-
tive returns to the educational services provided in one state are likely to
arise in a different state, thereby reducing the magnitude of the
estimated productivity coefficient.13
It should be emphasized that the above results, which suggest that
government spending on core infrastructure is of more importance than
other types of spending in explaining state-level variations in output,
are tentative and open to valid criticism along a number of dimensions.
As the theme of this conference is physical infrastructure, we will
address a number of the likely criticisms, focusing on the core infra-
structure expenditure category alone.
The likelihood of simultaneity bias is the first and no doubt
foremost difficulty in interpreting the above results as indicating an
insufficient level of infrastructure spending across states’ economies.
One might argue, for instance, that government spending on infrastruc-
ture is a "luxury" good, so that increases in per capita output and
income induce increases in the share of output devoted to infrastructure
uses.14 A second potential difficulty with the above results is that they
may not be robust to reasonable changes in the assumed depreciation
rate for private capital stocks and, therefore, to changes in the proxy for
the capital-output ratio.
Table 7 attempts to allay these concerns by providing instrumental
variables estimates for three assumed depreciation rates ranging from 4
percent to 6 percent. Two instruments were chosen for infrastructure
spending: federal grants to state and local governments (as a percentage
of total state and local revenues), GRNTR, and the initial year (1965)
stock of debt of state and local governments (also as a percentage of total
revenues), DEBTRo Federal grants have been shown by a number of
authors, beginning with Bahl and Saunders (1965), Osman (1966),
Gabler and Brest (1967), and Gramlich (1968), to influence total state and
local spending and, potentially, to stimulate state and local own-source
spending. However, as argued by Oates (1968), since most grants are of
a matching variety, federal grants may themselves be a function of state
and local spending. The appropriate instrument would then be the
matching rate, but unless the grants were of a variable-matching form
15 In a cross-country analysis of educational spending in a similar framework,
Aschauer (1990c) finds that the rate of return to education is statistically significant and lies
some 60 percent above the rate of return to private physical capital. However, we would
expect much less labor mobility in the cross-country model than in the cross-state model
herein.
14 It should be noted, however, that the reverse regression of infrastructure spending
on per capita output yields a negative coefficient equal to -.018 (s.e. = .007), so this
argument would seem to imply a downward bias in the estimated relationship between
infrastructure expenditure and per capita output.44 David Alan Aschauer
Table 7
Production Relationships for Per Capita Output, Capital Output Ratios, and
Infrastructure Spending under Varying Depreciation Rates
Dependent Variable ~- y/n
Depreciation
Rate (4%) (4%) (5%) (5%) (6%) (6%)
INSTR GRNTR DEBTR GRNTR DEBTR GRNTR DEBTR
FK .134 .162 .155. ,175 .169 .I82
(.029) (.034) (.031) (.039) (.034) (.044)
FG 2.286 2.196 2.376 2.162 2.471 2.140
(.375) (,551) (.373) (.576) (.380) (.606)
ne .131 ,125 .114 .120 .101 .117
(.024) (,030) (.024) (,032) (.025) (.034)
mw .183 .160 .174 .151 .165 .142
(,019) (.022) (.019) (.022) (.018) (,023)
w .150 .182 .146 ,183 .143 .185
(.023) (.024) (.022) (.025) (.022) (.026)
ha .290 .297 .291 .302 .295 .310
(.145) (.154) (.141) (.159) (.140) (.165)
~2             .998 ,997 .998 .997 .998 .997
SER .987 ,102 .086 .103 .086 .103
Note: Standard errors in parenIheses, Equations also include constant terms. See the text and Table 6
for definitions,
(as with public welfare) no scope would remain for variation across
states in this variable. We attempt to walk the fine line between the two
extremes of endogeneity and of insufficient variation across states by
expressing federal grants as a ratio to state and local revenue.
Recognizing that some will object to the use of the federal grants
variable in this manner, we also utilize initial state and local debt relative
to total revenues as an instrument for infrastructure spending. The idea
is that the initial stock of debt is dependent upon past government
spending and tax policies and that accumulated debt, to some extent,
will impinge upon future spending. Of course, one can object to this
instrument as well; past governments may have issued debt in the
(correct) anticipation of future increases in per capita output, income,
and tax revenue, rendering the debt ratio endogenous with respect to
future output, is
is We refer the reader to the "tax smoothing" theory of government debt issuance in
the macroeconomics literature. Basic references are Aschauer (1990a), Barro (1979) and
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If one is willing to accept either the federal grant or the initial debt
variable as a valid instrument, however, then upward simultaneity bias
does not appear to be a significant concern. Using either of the
instruments leads to estimated marginal productivities of infrastructure
services between 2.1 and 2.5, somewhat higher than the previous
estimates.16 The correlation (positive, as expected) of the grant variable
with infrastructure spending is somewhat closer than the correlation
(negative, as expected) of the initial debt variable, leading to tighter
coefficient estimates with the grant variable.17 Also, the results are
robust to alterations in the assumed depreciation rate and, thereby, to
variations in estimated capital-output ratios. As the assumed deprecia-
tion rate rises from 4 percent to 6 percent---and the associated capital-
output ratios decline--the estimated productivities of physical capital
increase. Hence, calculated elasticities of output with respect to private
capital remain in a fairly close and reasonable range, between .250 and
.259 in the case of grants as the chosen instrument and between .266 and
.313 for initial debt.
Another concern about the above specification and results may
revolve around the specification of returns to scale in production. It may
well be that government infrastructure services are "nonrival" in the
sense that the facilities are available to all users simultaneously; in such
a case, it would be the total amount of government spending, or
services, that is relevant for production and not the amount per person
or worker. In order to capture this possibility, we rewrite the original
production technology so as to read
y = ZKaGbN1 - a - b(1 - c)
Here, if c = 0, the production technology is characterized by constant
returns to scale across all productive inputs, private and public. If c = 1,
it is characterized by constant returns across private inputs, with the
implication of increasing returns across private and public inputs
together. A logarithmic transformation and substitution of output elas-
ticities, as before, then yields
y/n = [z + FK(K/Y)(k/y) + FG(G/Y)((g/y) + cn)] / [1 - FK(K/Y) - FG(G/Y)].
56 The two-stage estimation procedure actually employs the other right-hand-side
variables in the instrument list as well.
57 Specifically, the coefficient estimates linking the grants and initial debt variables to
core infrastructure spending equal .098 (s.e. = .015) and -.007 (s.e. = .002), respectively.
The simple correlations of grants and initial debt with core infrastructure spending equal,
in turn, .765 and -.439.46 David Alan Aschauer
Table 8
Production Relationships for Per Capita Output, Capital-Output Ratios, and
Infrastructure Spending, Allowing for Increasing Returns to Scale




































also include constant term. See the text and Table 6 for
Table 8 provides estimates of the production relation allowing for the
possibility of increasing returns to scale across all inputs. Evidence of
increasing returns to scale can readily be seen; the estimated value of c
is in the range of .5 and lies more than two standard errors from either
zero (constant returns to scale across all inputs) or unity (constant
returns across private inputs only). The estimated productivity of
infrastructure services is now in the range of 4.5, implying an elasticity
of output with respect to infrastructure of around .11.18
Finally, the literature contains evidence of the existence of "agglom-
eration economies" such that localities with a more concentrated pop-
ulation are associated with higher levels of per capita output and
18 Note that the production relation could have been estimated in a less constrained
form that allows population to interact freely with per capita output. However, the
computed likelihood ratio statistics, distributed as a chi-square random variable with one
degree of freedom, do not allow a rejection of the form shown above. For the case of grants
as the instrumental variable, the likelihood ratio statistic equals 1.63, while in the case of
initial debt as the instrumental variable, it is 2.26. These values are to be compared to the
10 percent critical value of the chi-square(1) distribution, 2.71.WHY IS INFRASTRUCTURE IMPORTANT? 47
Table 9
Production Relationships for Per Capita Output, Capital-Output Ratios, and
Infrastructure Spending, Adjusting for Population Density




















Note: Standard errors in parentheses, Equations also include constant term. See the text and Table 6 for
definitions.
income. Table 9 allows for the possibility that population density may
play a separate role in the determination of output across states. As can
be seen, however, population density has little marginal explanatory
power for output per capita. While having the proper sign for the
agglomeration economy argument, the coefficient linking population
density to output is quantitatively small--a I percent increase in density
being associated with a .002 increase (initial debt as instrument) or a .004
increase (grants as instrument) in output across states--and is insignif-
icantly different from zero at conventional levels.
Conclusion
In attempting to answer the query "Why is infrastructure impor-
tant?" this paper has pointed out some of the possible gains to the
quality of life and to economic performance that might arise from48 David Alan Aschauer
increased infrastructure investment. Numerous past infrastructure in-
vestments have been responsible for significant improvements in the
overall quality of life in terms of health, safety, economic opportunity,
and leisure time and activities. Similarly, recent empirical evidence, as
well as that established in the preceding section of this paper, suggests
that infrastructure expenditures may well have been a key ingredient to
the robust performance of the economy in the "golden age" of the 1950s
and 1960s.
Yet much remains to be done if we desire a future with a cleaner
environment, with safer urban streets, with increased mobility and
economic opportunity for the disadvantaged, and with an economy well
equipped to compete in the international arena. Such a future, it
appears, is desired by the general public at the present time; according
to the National Opinion Research Center’s 1989 general social survey,
over 70 percent of the respondents believe that as a nation we are
spending too little to improve the environment and to reduce crime,
while only 15.4 percent feel we are spending too little on the military. It
seems that the time is ripe for a reorientation of government spending
priorities, with a renewed emphasis on infrastructure investment, to
meet the challenges of the 1990s and the twenty-first century.
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The economy periodically produces puzzles that help to keep
economists employed. One of the best full-employment puzzles of
recent decades is the growth slowdown, dated variously as starting from
the late 1960s to the early 1970s. The reasons why growth slowed both
in the United States and in most other developed industrial countries,
and the importance of various phenomena in explaining the slowdown,
are matters of enormous consequence not just for economists but for
economic policy.
David Aschauer has made one of the more fascinating and impor-
tant contributions to this debate. He has called attention to the rather
extraordinary disregard by economists and others of the possible role of
public investment in explaining the slowdown. He has produced a
series of papers in support of his contention that a sharp deceleration of
public investment, especially investment in what he calls "core infra-
structure," is very nearly sufficient to explain why growth slowed in the
United States. What began as a solitary exercise bids fair to become a
veritable subspecialty, as scholars around the nation address the issue
he has raised. Few economists are able with a full lifetime of scholarly
effort to shake up the profession as much as Aschauer has done in just
a few years of professional life.
The paper presented at this conference continues his efforts to
marshall support for this thesis. Characterizing the paper as an effort to
*Director of Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution. These comments incorpo-
rate ideas of my Brookings colleagues Martin Baily, Barry Bosworth, and Clifford Winston,
and especially Charles Schultze.52 Henry I. Aaron
marshall evidence is an unusual way to introduce discussion of a paper
for an economics conference. But it is intentional, as this paper has the
flavor of a brief, rather than of a dispassionate evaluation of evidence.
Aschauer has had a valuable insight but has greatly exaggerated its
quantitative importance; this paper does little to advance the thesis he
propounded elsewhere.
My comments consist of three parts. The first assesses Aschauer’s
initial effort to show that retardation in public sector investment,
especially in core infrastructure, is largely sufficient to explain the
growth slowdown of the 1970s and 1980s. The focus here is the original
paper (Aschauer 1989) and Munnell’s subsequent update and extension
(Munnell 1990). The second part focuses on the paper for this conference
(Aschauer 1990) and the third concludes by musing a bit on the course
that the debate on the Aschauer thesis has taken so far.
The Aschauer Thesis
The Aschauer thesis consists of several elements. The first is that a
properly specified aggregate production function should include not
just privately owned capital but also publicly owned capital that con-
tributes to production counted in gross national product. The second
element is that when one specifies such a production function and
estimates it with aggregate time series data, the resulting coefficients on
publicly owned capital are large and indicate a very high marginal
product. The third element is that not all publicly owned capital is
equally important in this aggregate production relationship. In particu-
lar~ core infrastructure--consisting of highways, mass transit, airports,
electrical and gas facilities, water works, and sewers--is the element of
public capital that contributes the most to private productivity. Other
public capital and public labor seem to contribute little to productivity
growth.
Aschauer’s results are truly startling. According to a simulation
reported in Table 5 of the paper presented here, a $500 billion increase
in the 1988 stock of public sector capital would have boosted productiv-
ity 14.0 to 14.8 percent. Given gross domestic nonfarm business product
in 1988 of $3,418 billion (1982 dollars), the increase attributable to public
sector investment would be $479 billion to $509 billion, or about one
dollar increase in annual output per dollar of investment. Part of that
gain, to be sure, is the result of induced private investment.
The implied power of public sector investment is even more
impressive than this calculation suggests. Since Aschauer finds that only
"core infrastructure," which represents only 55 percent of public sector
capital, matters in his productivity equations, the increase in theDISCUSSION 53
relevant capital stock is $275 billion, implying a payoff of nearly $2 in
output for each additional $1 of core infrastructure.
When one confronts so startling a result, especially one that flows
from aggregate time series regressions based on levels of variables (on
which more presently), one should remember the warning Richard
Goode (1966, p. 213) sounded when confronted with a less startling
result:
No evidence is sufficient to establish an implausible result unless the
unreliability of the evidence would be more remarkable than the result which
it endeavors to establish.~
The remainder of this section argues that the result Aschauer presented
in his earlier paper and Munnell has updated is less plausible than the
possibility that the evidence they present is flawed. No doubt others
have presented some or all of these criticisms, as Aschauer has tried to
deal with someof them.
Aggregate Time Series
Economists seem to be divided into two categories: those who
regard aggregate time series regressions on variables expressed in levels
as a form of preliminary data analysis and those who take such
regressions seriously. The size of the first group has grown and that of
the second has shrunk with time, for several reasons. Various analysts
have pointed out that time series typically contain little information,
usually no more than a few real "observations" that are generated at
turning points or clear-cut inflection points. Time series are dominated
by trend and produce marvelous fits that tend to distract one from their
meager power to explain much of the relevant variance. The economet-
ric devices used to avoid these problems are many and varied: detrend-
ing, differencing, ratioing, and various econometric tricks.
Aschauer’s original paper (1989) uses none of these devices. It
reaches the conclusion that the elasticity of output with respect to public
capital is in the range of 0.38 to 0.56. Using a slightly longer series,
Munnell (1990) narrows the range to 0.31 to 0.39 and settles on 0.34.
Ordinarily, estimates of labor and private capital elasticities of output
are in the range of 0.7 and 0.3 respectively. If one assumes that the
1 The result Goode confronted was the finding of Richard Musgrave and Marion
Krzyzaniak that the corporation income tax is shifted more than 100 percent to consumer
prices, so that an increase in corporate profits taxes is good for corporations because it
boosts profits. The quotation from Goode is a paraphrase of an earlier statement by David
Hume.54 Henry I. Aaron
elasticities of labor and private capital sum to 1 and that the elasticity of
public capital is 0.34, then returns to scale are increasing and the
elasticities of private and public capital are about the same size. If one
assumes that returns to scale are constant, payments to capital and labor
exceed their productivity. Adjusting their elasticities so that the sum,
including the elasticity on public capital, equals 1, then the elasticity of
output with respect to private capital is reduced to 0.22, about two-
thirds that of public capital.
With these elasticities in mind, one can turn to the implied marginal
productivities. The stock of nonfarm, nonresidential private capital in
1988 was $4,202 billion. The stock of government nonmilitary capital
was $1,711 billion, but, as noted, only the 55 percent of that stock that
represents core infrastructure, or about $940 billion, showed up as
contributing to current output.2 Thus a 1 percent change in the stock of
private capital, or about $42 billion, could be expected to boost output by
0.22 to 0.30 percent, or by $8.9 billion to $12.1 billion in the first year.
The implied annual return is 21 percent to 29 percent.
In contrast, a I percent increase in core infrastructure, or about $9.4
billion, could be expected to increase output by $13.7 billion, an implied
annual return of about 146 percent, or five times that of private capital.
Just to be clear, this estimate implies a payoff period for public sector
infrastructure investment of just over eight months.
Another way of looking at this result is to consider by how much
the stock of infrastructure would have to increase to achieve an efficient
allocation of capital between private and public ownership. Since the
marginal product of any input, X, is related to its elasticity of output, E×,
by the relation E× = (X/Y)Fx, where Y is output and F× is the marginal
productivity of X, the ratio of the stock of private capital to the stock of
core infrastructure, when their marginal productivities are equal, is
simply the ratio of their elasticities.
If the 1988 stock of private capital is held at its historical value of
$4,202 billion, and if the elasticities of output with respect to private
capital and core infrastructure are taken as 0.30 and 0.34 respectively,
then core infrastructure would have to increase from $940 billion to
$4,763 billion or just over fivefold to equalize the marginal productivity
of private capital and core infrastructure.3
2 Other public capital, such as school buildings, probably contributes to output, but
the effects are so deferred that variations in the stock of such capital do not show up as
¯ explaining any significant part of current output, a point that Aschauer notes. Further-
more, this capital may be taken into account indirectly when the labor supply is based on
education-level-adjusted counts of the work force.
3 If one uses the smaller elasticity of output with respect to private capital implied by
constant returns to scale, the stock of core infrastructure would have to increase to $6,494.5DISCUSSION 55
Various readers will greet such calculations quite differently. To
some, they are simply confirmation of a fact that they knew all
along--that the American public sector is starved and that we are
making mistakes of Brobdingnagian proportions in not expanding
public sector investments enormously. But unless one has in mind
paving Texas, it is hard to imagine where one would find room for or
what one would buy with the nearly $5 trillion of core infrastructure that
Aschauer’s estimates suggest is needed in order to bring public invest-
ment into balance with private capital. To others, the results will be a
reminder that functional forms that seem reasonable cannot be trusted
when one moves far outside of the range over which the equation was
estimated. Still others, some of whom may count themselves members
of the first two groups, will conclude that these results indicate some-
thing is grossly wrong with the underlying model.
Because time series normally do not contain much information, and
variables expressed in levels normally are dominated by trends, it is
important to see whether time series regressions on data in levels hold
up under various transformations and in the presence of other plausible
variables. Table 1 presents a seri4s of equations, estimated by my
colleague Charles Schultze, that illustrate the consequences for the
regressions Aschauer has presented of this kind of sensitivity analysis.
Equation I is a near replication of Equation 1.1 in Aschauer (1989),
Table 1. The coefficient for public capital in Aschauer, estimated over the
period 1949-85, was 0.39, in contrast to the coefficient of 0.41 reported
here, estimated over the period 1951-85, Equation 2 introduces a new
variable, the exchange value of the dollar against the yen, for whose
inclusion no good theoretical case can be made but whose coefficient is
nevertheless highly significant by any reasonable test. This variable also
happens to have a time pattern somewhat like that of public sector
investment. The coefficient of public capital is reduced from 0.41 to 0.34.
I believe that Equation 2 illustrates a simple point: the statistical support
for the significance of an extremely improbable variable, the yen/dollar
exchange rate, is just as strong as the support for a result the magnitude
of which I regard as equally implausible.
Equations 3 through 5 are based on the first differences of the
variables. Equation 3, which includes the same variables as Equation 2,
produces similar values of the various coefficients, except that t values
are reduced with the removal of trend; in addition, the coefficient on
public capital drops a bit more, to 0.27. There is no reason for attaching
billion, a nearly sevenfold increase. If, on the other hand, one does the calculation with
respect to all public, nonmilitary capital, marginal productivities would be equalized when
public capital goes up to "only" 278 percent of its current size, or not quite triples.Table 1
Dependent Independent Variables
Variable
InO - InK Constant Time CU InL - InK InYen,-1,-2 InKe - InK ~2
(1) -1.72 0.007 0.48 0.37 0.41 .979
(-18.5) (2.8) (7.6) (3.3) (16.3)
(2) -2.07 0.010 0,43 0.45 0.09 0.34 .985
(- 16.0) (4.3) (7.5) (4.6) (3.6) (11.9)
~,(InO - InK) ACU &(InL - InK) &lnYen,-1 ,-2 D66 D74 &(INKe - InK)
(3) 0.01 0.26 0.50 0.15 0.27 .922
(2.7) (2.5) (2.8) (4.0) (3.0)
(4) 0.02 0.32 0.54 -0.006 -0.006 0.13 .882
(2.4) (2.6) (2.2) (-! .1) (-1.0) (0.8)
(5) 0.02 0.25 0.66 0.15 -0.004 -0.006 0.09 .924
(3.1) (2.2) (2.9) (4.1) (- 0.9) (- 1.2) (0.6)
Variable List: O = nonfarm business product; K = nonfarm business fixed capital; time = 1 for initial year and increases 1 per year; Yen = yen/dollar exchange rate;
KG = public nonmilitary fixed capital; D66 = 1 for 1966 and later years, zero otherwise; D74 = 1 for 1974 and later years, zero otherwise.
Period is 1951-85 for equations (1) and (4); 1952-85 for equation (2); and 1953-85 for equations (3) and (5).
t statistics are in parentheses.DISCUSSION 57
any greater weight to the values in Equation 2 than to the values in
Equation 3.
Equation 4 replaces the exchange value of the dollar against the yen
with a pair of time dummies for years after 1966 and 1974. The coefficient
of public capital drops to 0.13 and is not significantly different from zero
by any normal test. The fact that the drop in the rate of infrastructure
investment coincides with these two dummies and that these dummies
cut the coefficient of infrastructure in half simply calls attention to the
meagerness of the amount of information in the regression.
With the inclusion of both the exchange value of the dollar against
the yen and the pair of time dummies in Equation 5, the coefficient on
public capital drops still further to 0.09, and the t value is so low that one
suspects that if this were the equation originally estimated, Aschauer
and many others would be doing something different from what they
are doing now.
The point of this little exercise is not to claim the superiority of
Equations 2 through 5 to Equation 1. Rather, the point is that none of
them is worth much in trying to unravel why growth has slowed, and to
reinforce my earlier observation that time series regressions based on
data expressed in levels should not be taken very seriously. When the
results seem outlandish, some very careful analysis with other func-
tional forms and other variables is necessary. If the results are not
robust---and Aschauer’s are not--then the hypothesis under examina-
tion cannot be regarded as even provisionally confirmed and no policy
recommendations of any sort can rest on the results.
Similar caution is necessary with international cross-sectional data,
as indicated by Tanzi (1990). He finds that the ratio of public sector
investment to total investment adds nothing to the investment/GDP
ratio in explaining the growth of GDP in a regression based on
twenty-three developing countries. Adding one country, Botswana,
generates a positive coefficient, but the t value indicates that the effect of
public sector investment is statistically insignificant. The problem in
such regressions is that the results frequently depend sensitively on
which countries are included.
Absence of Competitive Test
The Solow-type production functions, of which Aschauer’s esti-
mates are an extension, rest on a sound foundation of microeconomic
theory. In particular, they rest on assumed competitive markets in
which factors are remunerated based on their marginal productivities.
No such test exists for public infrastructure. Public capital does not pass
any market test in which productivity is balanced against a market
measure.58 Henry J. Aaron
This fact implies that one cannot know whether the value of public
capital, as measured by the discounted present value of what it would
earn if remunerated based on marginal productivity, is accurately
indexed by the series published by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
which is based on cost. Studies of various categories of government
investments are replete with examples of both enormously profitable
and horrendously ill-conceived investments. If the published series
differed from the true series by some constant ratio, this error would
cause no problems in log linear regressions. But the difference between
the official series and some "true" series is probably not constant over
time. Hence, it is uncertain what productivity is really being regressed
against.
The absence of a competitive test raises more profound problems,
as indicated by the paper presented by Clifford Winston at this confer-
ence and in much greater detail elsewhere (Small, Winston, and Evans
1989). Winston finds that the United States builds roads inefficiently and
prices them inefficiently. Public expenditures on roads and private
expenditures on transportation are both higher than they would be if
roads were constructed differently (basically, thicker) and truck fees
were based on weight per axle, rather than fuel consumption. If road
construction and pricing were both optimal, taking account of the
response of road users to the fees and to reduced congestion, total
expenditures on roads should be reduced in the long run, not increased. Any
increase in outlays, beyond the levels Winston estimates, would reduce
social welfare, and those levels are below current outlays. Thus in one
major area of core infrastructure, which carries the load in Aschauer’s
equations, the maiginal welfare effect of increased spending on public
capital, after one rationalizes current outlays, is actually negative.
Several other issues arise concerning the original regressions that
also come up with respect to the paper for this conference, to which I
now turn.
The Two Papers
Aschauer’s paper for this conference really combines two essays,
distinct in content and style. The first is an informal brief for infrastruc-
ture investment. The second reviews earlier statistical findings and
presents new results that the author contends support his claim that the
rate of return to infrastructure investment is very high.DISCUSSION 59
Needs and Indicators
The informal brief begins with the unassailable assertion that govern-
ment expenditures of various kinds improve the quality of life by slowing
or reversing environmental degradation, by contributing to public safety,
by extending recreational opportunities, by improving public health, and
by providing other valuable services. Despite this valid insight, this section
is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, most of the claims, even if
sustained, do not indicate that infrastructure investment would contribute
anything to national product as conventionally measured, although it is
quite reasonable, even praiseworthy, to broaden readers’ understanding of
the contributions that public investment can make to an individual’s
well-being. Second, this Section simply repeats claims that public invest-
ments are good for us. These claims were made nearly two decades ago
and could be verified, but are not.
Furthermore, the reasoning in this section is highly informal and
some of it is probably wrong. For example, this section calls for more
road construction on the almost certainly false assumption that it would
produce less smog. (Can there be much doubt that, say, eliminating
urban roads and passenger cars would be a far more effective way to
reduce smog than to build more roads and thereby to encourage more
auto use?) This section also repeats claims of organizations that have
vested interests in the subjects under study, such as the Federal
Highway Administration’s projections of disastrously increased conges-
tion if its budget is not increased. This section also endorses measures to
curtail solid waste, which may or may not be a good idea; but they
would almost certainly reduce national output as conventionally mea-
sured, because they would convert costs of disposal from final outputs
into intermediate inputs. Investments in national parks would presum-
ably reduce national output as conventionally measured if these re-
sources were shifted from capital goods that yielded a flow of marketed
services.
My point is not that investments to improve the quality of the
environment or to reduce crime or to expand public recreation or to
reduce congestion on the roads are useless. Many of them are extremely
useful, even vital. Public investment decisions should not be guided
solely by how they affect measured national output. Some of the best
features that public investment can provide do not and never will
appear in measured output. A good case can be made for boosting
public investments. But a good case does not rest on repetition of ex
parte claims. In addition, the argument that public sector investments
contribute massively to measured national output is not strengthened
by arguing that such investments contribute to items that do not appear
in measured output.60 Hent~y J. Aaron
Statistical Findings
The second part of Aschauer’s paper, an attempt to review earlier
evidence and to introduce new findings in support of the key role of
public sector investment in determining economic growth, begins with
the simulation of the effects of increased public sector investment
referred to earlier. As indicated, the simulated effect of increased
investment appears implausibly large.
Then Aschauer turns to new empirical evidence relevant to the
productivity of public sector investment. This evidence consists of
regressions relating output per unit of labor input to the private
capital-output ratio and the public capital-output ratio, where the values
for each of these variables are averages spanning the period 1965
through 1983 for the 50 states. The marginal productivity of core
infrastructure is estimated to be 19 to 21 times larger than the marginal
product of private capital.
Before one bases policy on such estimates, one must ask once again
whether the model from which the results emerge makes sense and,
even more importantly in this case, whether the data used to estimate
the model are appropriate. Starting with the model, the lack of detailed
state-by-state data leads to the following assumptions:
The capital-output ratio differs among states, ranging from 2.32 to
1.10, but is constant in each state. (The justification for the
assumption of constancy is that no long-term trend has been
found in capital output ratios among countries.)
The depreciation rate is the same across states.
The employment-population ratio is the same in each state.
The marginal product of private capital is the same in all states.
The marginal product of public capital is the same in all states.
The rate of technical progress is uniform across all states.
This list of assumptions strains credulity, even for economists who are
trained to tolerate implausibility in the name of tractability. Each assump-
tion is almost certainly false. Tests showing the sensitivity of results to
these assumptions are shown only for variations in the rate of depreciation,
where variations do not matter much. But no reason is given to expect that
the results will be so insensitive to other assumptions.
The issue of reverse causation is treated with instrumental vari-
ables, but it cries out for direct modeling and testing (assuming that one
is willing to make all of the foregoing assumptions). In particular, it
seems plausible that opportunities for stronger than average growth in
per capita income would be associated both with rapid populationDISCUSSION 61
growth and with high rates of public sector investment, especially in
core infrastructure. Even use of data averaged over nearly two decades
is insufficient to deal with this problem, as the multi-decade growth of
the Sun Belt over the period in question suggests. This bias may well
account for the enormous coefficients on public sector investment. But
these coefficients do more to underscore the pitfalls of reduced form
estimation than they do to buttress the case that public sector invest-
ment is a major influence on economic growth.
The policy implications also should give pause. Few would proba-
bly question that the road-building program of the 1950s and 1960s
contributed to economic growth. The message of this analysis, however,
is that economic growth slowed largely because the program of road
construction ended. In view of the fact that the bulk of the productivity
slowdown has occurred in mining, construction, and services and little
or no s!owdown has occurred in manufacturing, it is hard to understand
how highways could bear so much of the blame.
The Course of the Debate
The debate on the Aschauer thesis is remarkable in two respects.
The first is that it has taken so long for someone to focus the attention
of the economics profession on the role of public investment in deter-
mining productivity. Students of why ideas remain dormant and when
and under what circumstances they emerge from shadow should find
enormously fascinating how it was that public investment remained
almost unmentioned in discussions of productivity in general and of the
productivity slowdown in particular. That it remained for a graduate
student to spotlight this issue in the mid 1980s, more than a decade after
the growth slowdown began, is downright bizarre.
Aschauer deserves enormous credit for calling the attention of a
blinkered profession to something that should have immediately com-
manded its attention. Clearly something peculiar was going on. Every-
one has known that.the public sector invests a lot and that the things it
invests in matter for private production. But we did not u~e that
knowledge to help explain the productivity slowdown. Perhaps atten-
tion to this issue awaited the release of official statistics on tangible
wealth (Musgrave 1986). Whatever the explanation, the almost complete
omission of changes in public sector investment from most of the efforts
to explain the growth slowdown is peculiar, and everyone is in Aschau-
er’s debt for redressing that oversight. No doubt public capital belongs
in any sensible aggregate production function.
The issue is not the sign of the coefficient of that variable--on that,
everyone agrees. The issue is the size of the coefficient, both in62 Henry ]. Aaron
retrospect and in prospect. Charles Schultze, who once remarked that
nothing was wrong with supply-side economics that dividing by ten
would not cure, updated that comment by saying nothing is wrong with
the Aschauer thesis that dividing by four would not cure.
The second peculiarity of the debate about the Aschauer thesis is
the credulous acceptance of the results by people who normally react
with sophisticated skepticism to econometric discoveries that the world
is really so very different from what we had supposed. One possible
explanation raises a fundamental issue in the analytical method. We all
pride ourselves on our bulldog persistence in subjecting every result to
remorseless scrutiny. But the truth is that each of us approaches any
problem with a set of maintained hypotheses. When statistical results
are consistent with these hypotheses, we tend to think they must be
right and we are less likely to continue investigation than if the results
conflict with our "priors." When the results conflict with these hypoth-
eses, we are more likely to continue looking.
I think that something of that reaction explains the acceptance of
results that seem to me to be implausibly large, although of the right
sign. Aschauer’s results have been most welcome among those who are
sick and tired--with good reason, in my view--of continuous and
unsupported allegations that everything the government does is waste-
ful or harmful. We know that is not true. So when a study comes along
showing only the dollars and cents value--not soft quality-of-life or
income-distribution stuff, but the real McCoy--of a large class of what
the government does, we clasp it to our bosom. So do organizations
such as the American Road and Transportation Builders Association
(Mudge and Aschauer 1990) who stand to gain hugely from a large
program of road-building that, according to Winston, may well have no
good economic justification whatsoever.
The lesson, I suggest, is that we should be especially careful when
we come upon a result that nicely fits our hopes and yearnings.
Confronted with a result that appears just too good to be true, the safest
reaction is that it probably is. Confronted with a policy backed by
extravagant promises, it is prudent to recall the maxim, "Married in
haste, we may repent at leisure."DISCUSSION 63
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Based on his earlier work and an extension thereof, Aschauer
estimates the productivity-raising power of infrastructure investment to
be huge, as much as quadrupling that of private investment. At a time
when it is customary to view public sector activity as inherently
wasteful, this is indeed a startling result. But while I do not share that
presumption, I feel uneasy with so high a ratio. Obviously, infrastruc-
ture investment should be allowed for in productivity analysis, and it is
indeed surprising this has not been done in past analysis. We are
indebted to the work of Aschauer and Munnell for having drawn our
attention to this omission. Nevertheless, Aschauer’s striking result
remains to be explained. Reference to similar results for R&D invest-
ment is not convincing, since R&D’s linkage to new technology gives it
a special role. Nor can one readily reject the hypothesis that the finding
reflects reverse causality or, as I prefer, a timing coincidence between
high productivity growth and high infrastructure investment. Finally,
why should Aschauer’s results differ so sharply from Munnell’s more
modest conclusions?
A closer look at the econometric procedure and its limitations is
thus in order, but I will leave this to more qualified critics. Instead, let
me recall Fritz Machlup’s insistence (from the Hopkins days) that
econometric results are never better than the analytical reasoning by
which they can be supported. Therefore, let me assume that Aschauer’s
results are correct and, taking the title of his paper literally, ask why it
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is that infrastructure investment should be more productive than
investment in an ordinary but honorable facility such as a mousetrap
plant. What are the peculiar characteristics that explain so large a
difference?
Being a scholarly type, I thought it best to begin by ascertaining just
what people mean when they refer to infrastructure investment. To my
surprise and dismay I found no such entry in any of the standard
sources such as the Palgrave, the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, or even
the Encyclopedia Britannica. I was puzzled further to find our conference
topic given as the shortfall in public investment, while the session
subtitles all refer to various aspects of infrastructure investment. Are we
to conclude that all infrastructure investment is public and that all public
investment is infrastructure? This is hardly the case. What, then, are the
peculiar characteristics that render an investment "infrastructure" and
might endow it with such unusual productivity?
None of the standard distinctions between types of investment
seem to draw the line. Infrastructure may take the form of human
investment (health and education) or it may be in physical assets
(roads). The asset may be in the form of a durable consumer good
(access roads to a recreation lake) or an intermediate or capital good
(freight-intensive highways). Next, the asset or the services it renders
may be private in nature so they can be provided through the market (a
toll bridge) or they may be public in nature, thus calling for budgetary
provision (a cross-country highway).
Looking for a better explanation, is infrastructure characterized by
entering at the, beginning or foundation of the production process, as
the term seems to suggest? Are we to go back to Quesnay and consider
land and natural resources the ultimate infrastructure? Or, does the
concept have a place in the mystique of Marxian capital theory and the
process by which labor inputs ripen into final output? Neither tack
seems helpful. A highway used for retail delivery at the very end of the
production process is no less infrastructure than one used for delivering
raw materials that enter at the beginning.
Having gotten nowhere with these familiar distinctions, let me
suggest that the peculiar thing about infrastructure of the intermediate
good type is that it enters as a common input into many uses. By the
term "many," I do not refer simply to the fact that the service is used by
many firms. This is necessary if the structure is to be public, so that joint
use precludes exclusion and preference revelation. But the service may
also be private in nature so that price exclusion is appropriate. The term
"many" as used here instead refers to the condition that a wide range of
industries is involved. Thereby infrastructure investment may affect the
productivity of private capital and labor across the board, bearing, as
Aschauer puts it, on the health of the aggregate economy.66 Richard A. Musgrave
Given that infrastructure investment is thus characterized by its
joint and cross-industry use, does it also follow that therefore it must be
especially productive? This is the question that has to be answered
before accepting the econometric result. As the perfect marketeer will
tell us, investment will be carried to the point where the same return is
obtained at the margin. True enough, but what happens at the optimal
margin may not be what happens in the real world. The question then
is Why a deficient level of infrastructure investment should leave an
especially heavy loss of producer surplus, or why catching up to the
optimal level should secure an unusually large gain. Could the cross-
industry use of such investment result in a kinked efficiency-of-in-
vestment schedule, so that the return over the range of investment
deficiency was unusually high, without the same holding for further
increments of investment? I am aware that I have raised questions rather
than given answers, but these are issues, I think, that need to be further
explored.
While I have suggested that cross-industry use is a distinguishing
feature of infrastructure investment, it does not follow that all industries
should participate equally. Some lines of output may be more infrastruc-
ture-intensive than others, and various types of infrastructure invest-
ment may be more important for one industry or another. A more
disaggregated approach may thus be helpful, and by focusing on
inter-industry cross-section analysis, the problem of timing coincidence
between productivity and investment growth may be avoided.
Before leaving the intermediate goods case, a word about the role of
cost-benefit analysis. This is briefly touched upon in Aschauer’s paper
and the usual doubts are raised. The fashion has been to stress these
shortfalls, but I wonder whether the difficulties of drawing inferences
from econometric analysis are not as great or greater. After all, cost-
benefit analysis applied to the case of intermediate goods does not have
to face the ultimate problem of evaluating consumer preference for final
output. All that is needed is to estimate cost savings in production.
Cost-benefit analysis remains an essential part of the problem and I
would have liked to see a paper at this conference on that topic. While
much and perhaps more than necessary has been said about the proper
rate of discount, much remains to be done in improving the application
of cost-benefit analysis to particular situations.
So much for infrastructure investment in intermediate goods. The
remainder goes to provide for durable consumer goods of various sorts.
Such goods enter by adding directly to consumer welfare, rather than
via raising private sector productivity. They may provide positive
benefits as does maintenance of a recreation lake or they may go to
prevent or limit external costs generated by private sector activity, costs
that do not come to be accounted for in the calculus of the market. WhileDISCUSSION 67
I have not seen a direct estimate, I gather that as much as one-half of
infrastructure investment may be directed toward the provision of
consumer benefits, and this is where the quality-of-life issues, dealt with
in the first part of Aschauer’s paper, enter.
Given the growing impact of environmental damage on the quality
of life, it becomes increasingly important not only to measure economic
performance in terms of recorded GNP but also to supplement the
measurement by a calculation of benefits and costs not yet accounted
for. Towards this task, the kind of statement developed by Terleckyj and
published annually by the United Nations is a good first step, but a first
step only. Measuring the reduction in air pollution or in the crime rate
is useful, as is measuring the effectiveness of various programs in
securing such results. But these are first steps only. In order to decide
how much public investment is called for, or to assess the size of the
prevailing deficit therein, dollar values must be placed on these out-
comes. Once more cost-benefit analysis becomes essential, including
now its most difficult task of assessing consumer evaluation.
Does the nature of infrastructure investment bear upon the political
economy of its provision and potential deficiency? Looking at the supply
side, I see no particular reason why infrastructure-producing industries
such as construction companies should be any less successful in press-
ing their services upon governmental providers than other suppliers to
governmental agencies. However, a difference may be found on the
demand or user side. The cross-industry use of infrastructure facilities
may render it more difficult to generate pressure groups than is the case
for intermediate goods, which are used primarily by firms within a given
industry. Moreover, the consumers of the final product into which the
intermediate good enters may not be aware of its importance to them
and thus fail to render political support. Even where infrastructure
supplies final services, these may be remote in nature, as in the case of
environmental improvements, and again suffer weakened support.
Thus various political reasons may cause adequate support to be
lacking. Interjurisdictional benefit or cost spillovers pose a further
problem.
Given these difficulties of fiscal choice, cannot the problem be
resolved more readily by privatization, leaving the choice of provision to
the market? Consider a setting that is rival in consumption, so crowding
occurs but is subject to decreasing cost, thus calling for a natural
monopoly. Landfills and toll bridges and, for that matter, most public
utilities are cases in point. These are situations where private provision
is possible but the public hand is needed by way of regulation, so as to
provide efficient utilization and pricing. Or, public provision is a
possibility. Which route is preferable depends on the particular case, but
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option does not exist. This is the case where use is non-rival so that
exclusion and provision by sale (instead of budgetary finance) would be
inefficient. The benefits of cleaned air should not be rationed by
requiring people to wear gas masks unless they pay a fee. Or, the use of
uncrowded highways should not be restricted by tolls, even where a toll
charge is feasible. The range over which privatization-cum-control offers
a feasible alternative is thus limited, and it would be interesting to know
what shares of the problem are open to the various solutions.
Quite possibly, the emergence of "quality of life" problems adds to
the share calling for budgetary action. Rather than suggesting privati-
zation, de-privatization may be called for. Air pollution, to take a most
obvious example, treats the use of air as if it were a private resource,
thereby disregarding external costs and damages to the community.
Once more, the appropriate measure may take the form of public
provision or of regulation. The one therefore cannot be discussed without
the other.
This conference, quite appropriately, was limited to the case of
physical infrastructure, thereby reducing an otherwise unmanageable
topic to a manageable range. But it may also be noted in concluding that
physical assets are but part of the problem. Human investment in health
and education may be no less important, as both intermediate and
consumer goods, and cannot be excluded from a more comprehensive
analysis. Going even further, the very existence of the state, the judicial
system, and for that matter the prevailing work ethic are important
features of the overall environment in which the economic process is
conducted and may be said to provide its infrastructure.